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Respondents/Defendants State of Utah, Utah State 
Insurance Department, and Utah State Tax Commission (referred to 
herein as "State") respectfully reply to the "Rehearing Petition 
of Appellant/Plaintiff Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah". 
INTRODUCTION 
This case originated with BCBS attacking the imposition 
of a 2.25 percent subscription income tax on health care 
providers under Chapter 37 of Title 31, Utah Code Ann., of which 
BCBS is one such organization. An identical 2.25 percent tax 
was imposed upon the premiums received by insurers, which were 
entities organized under a number of other chapters in Title 31. 
However, in computing this tax, mutual benefit associations 
("KBAs") were then allowed to deduct of the taxes paid on the 
premiums received by the KBAs, thus in effect "exempting" the 
KBAs from paying any tax on premiums the KBAs collected. 
In its July 19, 1989 opinion, the Court gave an 
extensive analysis to the two main constitutional challenges 
brought by BCBS to the imposition on BCBS of the tax on premium 
2 
income while excluding the MBAs. After reviewing the history of 
insurers in the State, determinining the proper classes, and 
subjecting the State's taxing scheme to a rigorous three part 
For convenience, both the subscription tax and the premium tax 
will be referred to herein as the "premium tax". 
2 
In reality, under the Court's analysis, there was only one 
challenge, -- the "uniform operation of the laws" provision of 
the Utah Constitution, since the Court determined that a law 
passing muster under that provision would also pass muster under 
the "Equal Protection clause" of the United States Constitution, 
and the "private or special law" provision of the Utah 
constitution is just the flip side of the "uniform operation of 
the laws" provision. 
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test, the Court upheld the decision of the District Court 
granting summary judgment to the State. 
BCBS claims that the Court has subjected BCBS to a 
test — the showing of economic disadvantage — which was not 
part of the law when this case originated, or was briefed, or 
argued. Thus, says BCBS, they never had notice that they had to 
show economic disadvantage. They then argue that despite their 
not being aware of the additional test, they did, in fact, 
-prove" economic disadvantage. Finally, BCBS pleads that if the 
Court rejects BCBS's first two mutually exclusive arguments, the 
appropriate remedy is for the matter to be remanded to the 
District Court to allow BCBS to present evidence of its economic 
disadvantage in having had to pay the premium tax. 
The State will address each of BCBS's points, and then 
add some additional points. 
II. BCBS'S CLAIM THAT THE C0U5RT HAS ADDED A NEW ELEMENT TO 
BCBS'S BURDEN OF ATTACKING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TAX 
BCBS argues that the Court has imposed a new element to 
a party attacking the constitutionality of a tax — that of 
showing economic disadvantage. BCBS further argues that because 
its -competitive position in its market is obviously different 
from that of Mountain Fuel's, the analysis used by the Court in 
Mountain Fuel should not be applied to BCBS's challenge. 
What BCBS fails to recognize is that the Court has not 
mandated a showing of -economic disadvantage" to one challenging 
the constitutionality of a tax. In its opinion, the Court noted: 
There is nothing inherent in the article I, 
section 24 test as it was stated in Malan and 
our other decisions based on equal protection 
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or uniform operation of the laws principles, 
[citations omitted] that expressly requires 
us, in determining the constitutionality of 
an enactment, to take into account the impact 
of the legislative classification under 
attack on those classified. However, it 
seems clear that the impact of a measure can 
be relevant to determining whether the 
legislative body has exceeded the bounds of 
the broad discretion it has in fashioning 
purely economic legislation. 
(Slip op. at 13.] 
Nowhere in its opinion does the Court hold that a party 
challenging the constitutionality of a tax must show the economic 
impact of the classification in order to challenge successfully 
the tax. The Court only says that such a showing would seem to 
be relevant to the question as to whether the legislature has 
exceeded the broad discretion it has in imposing taxes for 
revenue purposes. 
The citation to Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988) was not for the purpose of 
imposing an ex post facto requirement upon BCBS. The Court in 
Mountain Fuel did not announce a new requirement to showing a 
classification for tax purposes is unconstitutional. The Court 
there applied the basics of earlier cases cited both in Mountain 
Fuel and in the instant case. It certainly doesn't appear from a 
reading of Mountain Fuel that Mountain Fuel thought it was being 
blindsided by the Court's opinion. Mountain Fuel had attempted 
to show it had suffered economic harm because of the tax imposed 
upon it but not on providers of certain other forms of fuel 
competing with natural gas. The Court applied the earlier cases 
and determined Mountain Fuel had not met its burden. 
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The same is true with respect to the Court's finding in 
the instant case that BCBS had simply not met its burden 
established by earlier cases enunciated by this Court. 
Furthermore, BCBS was certainly aware of this critical element 
when they originated this case and when they argued their motion 
for partial summary judgment. The gravamen of their case was 
that they had been economically disadvantaged by their having to 
pay the subscription tax. BCBS even admits in the third point of 
its rehearing petition that they attempted to make a case showing 
they had been economically disadvantaged in having to pay the 
premium tax vis-a-vis the MBAs which didn't have to pay that tax. 
Their motion for partial summary judgment contained ten pages of 
facts (R. 285-295), plus sixteen (16) exhibits of over 150 pages 
(R. 330-454). The District Court was simply not convinced BCBS 
had met their burden of proof, and neither was this Court. 
BCBS also argues that its market position is "obviously 
different from that of Mountain Fuel's", and therefore Mountain 
Fuel cannot be applied. BCBS presents no facts or allegations to 
support why it believes this conclusion is so "obvious"; perhaps 
the reference is to Mountain Fuel's being a regulated monopoly, 
whereas BCBS is not. However, BCBS, as all insurers, is 
certainly heavily regulated by the Utah Insurance Department, and 
while it may not be a "state authorized monopoly", as Mountain 
Fuel is, BCBS is certainly one of the best known and largest 
health care insurers (using that term in the generic sense) in 
Utah. As for the dollar amounts involved, extrapolating from the 
information in Mountain Fuel (752 P.2d at 886), Mountain Fuel 
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paid taxes of $11 million over a five (5) year period. The rate 
varied from 6 percent to 4 percent. If the average of 5 percent 
is used, then the taxes paid of $11 million over a 5 year period 
were generated from $220 million in revenues. Extrapolating from 
BCBS's own -facts" (and as is more clearly illustrated in the 
next point), if the 2.25 percent premium tax paid by BCBS 
totalled $5 million from March 1982 through June 1987 (when the 
subscription tax and premium taxes were removed on health 
insurance and similar insurance like products), then BCBS had 
subscription income of over $222.2 million for that period of a 
little over five (5) years, which, to use BCBS's phrase, is "what 
most would consider to be a rather 'substantial' amount". (Reh. 
pet. at 7, fn. 2.) 
The similarity between the income, taxes paid and 
period of years between Mountain Fuel and BCBS are startling, but 
probably irrelevant. The District Court, however, and this Court 
had the record available to determine whether based upon the 
facts presented BCBS had sustained an economic disadvantage 
because BCBS had to pay the premium tax and the MBAs did not. 
Based upon the evidence in the file, both Courts found BCBS had 
not met its burden of proof. 
II. BCBS'S CLAIM THAT IT HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT IT HAS BEEN 
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPETITIVELY DISADVANTAGED IN COMPETITION 
WITH THE NON-TAXED MBAS 
After BCBS has taken two (2) pages explaining that it 
was "surprised" by the Court's "requirement" that BCBS 
demonstrate that it has been economically disadvantaged by its 
having to pay the premium tax, BCBS spends three and a half pages 
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f 
arguing that BCBS did, in fact, demonstrate that it had been 
economically disadvantaged. It is in this part that BCBS takes 
its greatest liberties with the facts. 
BCBS asserts that "[i]t was not seriously disputed by 
the State . . . that [BCBS] competes directly with two MBAs for 
insurance business". (Reh. pet. at 6-7.) In fact, the State 
argued strenuously throughout that BCBS doesn't really compete 
with any of the MBAs. The State filed a 45 page memorandum in 
opposition to BCBS's motion for partial summary judgment, 
including three and one-half pages of facts plus eleven pages of 
legislative history. As noted above, four of the MBAs are 
captives, or provide insurance to employees of only one company. 
Of the other two, one doesn't even write health insurance. The 
sixth, Gem State, markets only to smaller companies, a market 
which BCBS tended to ignore until recently. 
BCBS then cites the "evidence" of economic disadvantage 
it presented to the District Court. This consisted of two 
affidavits — one from a senior BCBS officer, and the other from 
a senior BCBS actuary. The Court, in its opinion, cited only the 
former, twice correctly terming it a "conclusory affidavit" (slip 
op. at 9 and 16). BCBS suggests the Court "overlooked" the 
second, which BCBS deems to be "a critical piece of evidence". 
In fact, the second only states that when setting rates, BCBS 
»ust factor in the cost of the subscription taxes it must pay. 
This rather unstartling revelation is somewhat akin to a store 
stating it must take into account the cost of the goods it sells 
when it prices them for sale to customers. There is little 
wonder the Court made no mention of this second affidavit. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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As for the former memo, BCBS opines that "(t]he State 
made no meaningful challenge to the adequacy of [that] affidavit 
but rather filed a brief counteraffidavit alleging that at least 
one small business had purchased its policy of insurance from an 
HBA rather than [BCBS] because of a family connection with the 
MBA, and not a difference in rates." (Reh. pet. at 8.) In fact, 
the State countered virtually every assertion made in the first 
affidavit. That affidavit stated that without the premium tax, 
BCBS believed it could successfully compete for the business of 
several school districts, several subsidiaries of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and a subsidiary of Utah Power 
& Light Co. To counter those allegations, the State responded 
that since each of those entities owns its own MBA, it was highly 
unlikely they would steer their business to BCBS even if BCBS 
offered the same or even (up to a point) lower rates. The 
affidavit then alleges that without the subscription tax, BCBS 
believed it could have obtained the business of a number of other 
entities that were insured by Gem State, and named eight (8) of 
those entities. The State refuted that claim through the 
affidavit of the owner of one of the named entities, who said he 
went with Gem State for reasons other than the "price of 
insurance". The State didn't believe it was necessary to counter 
the claim of BCBS with respect to each of the companies named by 
BCBS — the one affidavit was enough to discredit the entire 
claim of BCBS in that affidavit, because it refuted the assertion 
made by BCBS that but for the premium tax, BCBS would have had 
the business of all those named companies. 
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BCBS asserts that the characterization of the first 
affidavit as -conclusory" indicates an obvious -misapprehension 
of important facts- by the Court, and that it further indicates 
the Court -failed to consider the additional affidavits submitted 
by BCBS". (Reh. pet at 9.) In truth# the Court correctly 
identified the first affidavit as being conclusory. It was also 
self-serving, and was rightly disregarded by the Court as having 
little merit. As for "other" affidavits, besides the second 
affidavit from the BCBS actuary, the only other affidavit 
submitted by BCBS was from one of the counsel for BCBS, which 
stated an article had appeared in a local newspaper, and the 
article was attached to the affidavit. (Ex. 13, R. 412.) The 
Court, which correctly gave little mention and little weight to 
the first affidavit, rightly ignored and gave no weight to these 
latter two affidavits. 
Lastly on this point, BCBS gratuitously alleges that 
-the State (to its credit) never challenged [BCBS's] evidence in 
the record below in support of the patently obvious proposition 
that paying several million dollars not paid by one's competitors 
in a fiercely competitive market constitutes significant harm." 
However, while the State would like to accept this -compliment", 
the facts prevent it from doing so. The State did concede, of 
course, that BCBS had paid the premium tax, as required by law. 
The State, though, not only never conceded, but in fact 
strenuously rejected, the notion that by paying the premium tax, 
BCBS was at a significant disadvantage with its competitors. The 
State presented the findings of the Legislature in 1969, that by 
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not subjecting BCBS to the premium tax being paid by virtually 
all other insurers, BCBS was enjoying a significant advantage 
over those other insurers. The State argued that the captive 
nature of virtually all of the MBAs, plus the restrictive nature 
of their marketing, plus the small size of the MBAs, especially 
when compared with a market giant such as BCBS, did not put BCBS 
at a disadvantage at all. 
IV. BCBS'S CLAIM THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE 
DISTRICT COURT 
BCBS asserts in two places (Reh. pet. at 2, fn. 1 and 
at 10) that in reality, all the District Court did was deny 
BCBS's motion for summary judgment, and therefore, the matter 
should be remanded to the District Court so BCBS can -put on its 
evidence" to show that BCBS has suffered economic harm by having 
to pay the subscription tax. BCBS suggests that the granting of 
the motion for summary judgment in favor of the State was "merely 
a procedural aid to this appeal". 
Of all the misstatements of facts made by BCBS 
throughout these proceedings, the misstatements of fact in this 
section are the most egregious. From the beginning, it was BCBS 
who pushed these proceedings along. The record shows the 
original complaint was filed September 24, 1982 (R. 2). On 
October 25, 1982, before the State had even filed its answer, 
BCBS filed its first set of interrogatories and requests for 
admissions (R. 21, 18), and on November 9, 1982, filed its first 
request for production of documents (R. 26). 
The State filed its answers to the interrogatories on 
November 24, 1982, (R. 36), and two weeks later BCBS filed its 
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motion to compel and set the hearing on that motion for the 
following week. The hearing was held on December 16, 1982 (R. 
68), and the next day, BCBS filed its second set of 
interrogatories and second set of requests for admissions (R. 
69). Both were answered on January 14, 1983 (R. 268, 272), and 
six (6) days later, BCBS filed its third set of interrogatories. 
On February 22, 1983, the State answered BCBS's third 
set of interrogatories (R. 278), and one week later, on March 1, 
1983, BCBS filed its motion for partial summary judgment (R. 281) 
and set the hearing for March 14, 1983 (R. 457). The matter was 
heard on March 22 and 23, 1983 (R. 546). 
The District Court delivered its memorandum decision on 
September 13, 1983 (R. 744) and the Order was entered on October 
3, 1983 (R. 748). On November 10, 1983, the State filed its 
motion for summary judgment (R. 768), and the matter was heard 
and the Court granted the State's motion on November 14, 1983 (R. 
771). The Order was entered December 6, 1983 (R. 788), and the 
notice of appeal was filed December 9, 1983 (R. 794). 
There is certainly nothing wrong with a party moving 
litigation along; in fact, it is to be encouraged, rather than 
discouraged. However, as illustrated in point II above, BCBS 
knew it had to show some economic harm. It certainly wasn't 
enough to show that BCBS and the other hospital and medical 
providers organized and regulated under Chapter 37 of Title 31, 
Utah Code Ann, were regulated under a different chapter of Title 
31 than the MBAs. BCBS knew it had to show economic harm, and it 
thought it had done so (Point III of Reh. Pet.). BCBS had all 
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the time it needed to discover facts to present in a motion for 
summary judgment or at trial. The State, while not dragging its 
feet, constantly responded to the discovery requests from BCBS. 
With the situation the way it was, the State never did conduct 
any discovery, and its statement of points in opposition to 
BCBS's motion for partial summary judgment was the first and only 
attempt by the State to present any evidence or argument. Yet on 
March 1, 1983, only six months after this action was commenced, 
BCBS believed it had conducted all the discovery necessary and 
had all the facts it needed to proceed with its motion. BCBS 
presented ten (10) pages of facts in its memorandum in support of 
its motion (R. 285 to 295), plus nearly 150 pages of exhibits (R. 
330-454). On the second page of its motion, BCBS admitted, as it 
had to, there was "no genuine issue as to any material fact" so 
that BCBS "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (R. 282). 
If the record could be supplemented here with 
affidavits from counsel for the State as to the role of BCBS in 
having the State's motion for summary judgment filed, heard and 
granted, it would clarify some points. Since that is not 
possible, the State points out that only a month after the Order 
denying BCBS's motion for partial summary judgment was entered, 
the State filed its motion for summary judgment. Not only was 
the State's motion filed on November 10 (a Wednesday) and heard 
only four (4) days later on November 14 (a Monday), but the 
motion and the notice of hearing were only mailed to BCBS on 
November 10 (R. 767, 770). The motion itself is less than a page 
long in substance, and merely says that all pertinent facts are 
before the Court from the BCBS motion for summary judgment. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Although no new facts or argument were presented in the 
State's motion for summary judgment# BCBS did not object to the 
lack of notice of the hearing, or lack of time to object to the 
State's motion. BCBS also did not produce any more facts for the 
Court to consider. BCBS was represented by counsel at the 
hearing, and there is nothing to indicate that BCBS objected to 
the entry of the State's motion for summary judgment. 
What BCBS is urging the Court to do is to allow it a 
second bite at the apple to present more evidence, now that two 
courts have ruled it didn't meet its burden of proof. BCBS could 
have conducted additional discovery and presented additional 
evidence before it filed its motion for partial summary judgment. 
When that motion was denied, BCBS could have at that point 
conducted additional discovery and presented any additional 
evidence at trial. BCBS chose not to do so, confident that this 
Court would reverse the District Court. BCBS had its chance to 
build and present its case six (6) years ago, and chose not to do 
so. BCBS cannot now be allowed to go back and do what it had the 
opportunity then to do but chose not to do. 
V. IF THE MATTER IS REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT TO PRESENT 
EVIDENCE, BOTH PARTIES WILL BE DISADVANTAGED BECAUSE OF THE 
PASSING OF TIME 
This matter began in October 1982, and was based upon 
subscription taxes paid under protest by BCBS for the period 
April 1, 1982 through September 30, 1982. The last such taxes 
were paid for the period ending June 30, 1987, when the premium 
tax was removed from all insurance and insurance-like products. 
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In the affidavit which the Court rejected as 
conclusory, and BCBS believes contained virtually all the facts 
BCBS needed to prove its case, assertions are made that BCBS 
could have won the business of several companies were it not for 
the premium tax. That affidavit was filed over six (6) years 
ago. Since the premium tax was removed effective July 1, 1987, 
at best, information on what companies were contacted by BCBS, 
during the time BCBS had to pay the premium tax, and what 
companies went with an MBA and why, is over two (2) years old. 
As stated above, the main target of BCBS, and the entity whose 
operation understandably gave this Court the most trouble, was 
Gem State, who marketed basically only to smaller companies. 
Because they were smaller companies, it is likely that many of 
are no longer in existence, and even more likely that many of the 
people who would have made the decisions as to which insurer the 
company chose to provide its employees with coverage are no 
longer with the companies, and perhaps no longer even in Utah. 
To impose such a burden upon the State, and upon BCBS at this 
point, would be most cumbersome, unfair, and perhaps impossible. 
VI. IF THE CLASSIFICATION EXEMPTING THE MBAS FROM TAXATION IS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPAIRED, THE PROPER REMEDY IS FOR THE 
COURT TO STRIKE DOWN THE EXEMPTION 
The Court noted that the "deduction" for MBA premiums 
under Utah Code Ann. S 31-14-1(1) (Supp. 1981) was technically a 
deduction, but that since the deduction effectively eliminated 
the premium tax for MBAs, it is a de facto exemption. 
It is well settled that in tax law, if a classification 
providing an exemption or deduction to a group is found to be 
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constitutionally defective, the proper remedy is to strike down 
the exemption or deduction, rather than expanding the exemption 
or deduction to include persons the legislative branch did not 
intend to be covered by the exemption or deduction. (See Brief 
of the State at 40-41). 
VII. CONCLUSION 
BCBS knew it had to show substantial economic harm to 
have the Court grant its motion for partial summary judgment. 
This Court did not impose a new standard from the Mountain Fuel 
case upon BCBS — Mountain Fuel is only an application of the 
same standards this Court has been applying for a number of 
years. Furthermore, BCBS did attempt to show by facts that it 
had suffered substantial economic disadvantage by having to pay 
the subscription tax while the MBAs did not have to pay the tax. 
BCBS simply failed to provide enough evidence to persuade either 
the District Court or this Court. BCBS also had plenty of 
opportunities in the District Court to conduct discovery and 
present all the evidence it could. BCBS should not be given an 
opportunity now to go back and do what it chose not to do. It 
would also be most unfair to remand this matter to the District 
Court to allow the presentation of further facts now, given the 
amount of time that has passed since this action began. Finally, 
if this Court should be persuaded that the classification of the 
MBAs for the purposes of exempting them from a tax similarly to 
the subscription tax is unconstitutional! the proper remedy is to 
strike down the exemption or deduction for the MBAs. 
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The opinion of the Court should be reaffirmed without 
rehearing. 
Respectfully submitted this day of September, 1989. 
STEPHEN 6. SCHWENUT 
Chief, Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. 
CE ^  "- ~ BRY J^ PETTEY
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. 
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